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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANCES A. CUTLER,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

v.

)

DALE BOWEN,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 13554

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover a partnerf s share of monies
paid by the Salt Lake City Relocation Agency to compensate
for the disruption of business when the property leased for
the business was taken for the Salt Palace.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and made a final accounting of partnership monies.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the trial court's
judgment affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent was working as night bartender at the Havana
Club in June, 1968. (R 60, 61)

Appellant needed someone to

run the Havana Club and requested Respondent to do so as a
partner, with expenses and profits divided equally.

(R 63, 88)

Appellant had a ranch in Idaho which took nearly all his time
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and Respondent was to hire, fire, pay the bills, keep the
books, make purchases, take care of the money, and to do
whatever was necessary to run the business.

(R 64-67) Re-

spondent ran the Havana Club in that manner from June 1968
until April 10, 1972.

(R 63, 75)

Appellant returned to

his ranch except for periodic visits at which times Appellant
and Respondent had an accounting.

(JR 65, 66)

For the calendar years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972, Ronald
Kingston, a public accountant of thirty years' experience,
prepared and filed partnership income tax returns, state and
federal, in the names of Frances Cutler and Dale L. Bowen,
dba Havana Cluh (R 78, 80, 81, 106, 108, Ex. 7P, 8P, 14P-16P)
Such returns reflected that each partner owned a fifty percent
(50%) interest in the partnership, that the net income was
divided equally between them, and that Respondent devoted
full time to the business and Appellant none.
14P-16P)

(Ex. 7P, 8P,

Appellant made no objection to this accounting

or partnership designation during this time, (R 10 7, 67) and
counsel stipulated that Appellant had introduced Respondent
on occasions as his "partner*"

(R 162B)

On April 10, 1972, the property on which the business was
located was acquired by the Redevelopment Agency.

(R 75, Ex. IP)

The agency paid $10,000 to the Havana Club as a displaced
business under the redevelopment program, such payment being
in lieu of "moving and related" expenses.

(R 116, 17D, 71-73)

2
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It was not paid either as the fair market value of a going
business nor of the leasehold or fixtures used in the business .

(Ex. 17D)

Before the business qualified for the $10,000 payment
under the redevelopment program, the "displaced business
concern" had to be a business that could not be relocated
without a substantial loss of its existing patronage,
could not be part of a commercial enterprise having another
establishment and had to be a business which contributed
materially to the income of the "displaced owner."
116, Ex. IP, 17D)

(R 115,

The definition of "owner" included

"the principal partners in a partnership."

(Ex. 17D)

Prior to April 10, 1972, Respondent and Defendant were
openly looking for and negotiating the purchase of another
club, (R 69-72, 117B, 125B-126B) during which time the first
$5,000.00 was paid to the Havana Club, the check being made
payable to both Respondent and Appellant.
Ex. 10D)

(R 75B, 71,

Said check was endorsed by Respondent and de-

livered to Defendant in the belief and upon the representation
that it would be used as a down payment on another club.
(R71-73, 126B)

No purchase of another club was made and

Appellant deposited the $5,000.00 check into his own bank
account.

(R 128B)

When the Havana Club was closed on April 10, 1972,
Appellant removed the fixtures and inventory to his Apex
Club, for which Respondent asserts no claim.

(R 99)

3
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The second $5,000.00 payment from the Redevelopment
Agency, less $100.00, was paid to both parties after this
action was filed and is now on deposit with the American
Savings and Loan Association in a savings account set
up by stipulation of the parties pending the final determination of this law suit.
y

(R 73-74)

ISSUES

The sole issue so far as Respondent is concerned
is whether the trial judge had sufficient facts upon
which to base his decision for

the Respondent, but this

issue will be discussed under the following points:
1.

This Court should affirm on appeal as there are

sufficient facts to justify the lower court's decision
and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
2.

The preponderance of the evidence indicates that

a partnership was formed on an oral agreement between
Appellant and Respondent.
3.

A payment "in lieu of moving and related expenses"

is in the nature of compensation for disruption of business
and income must be divided equally between partners.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM ON APPEAL AS THERE ARE
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO JUSTIFY THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION AND THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
This Court has repeatedly stated on appeal that the
decision of the lower Court will be affirmed unless it is
4
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clear that the lower court abused its discretion or had
no basis in the facts for its decision. As was stated
in Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981 (1958), at
264,
The plaintiff having prevailed below is
entitled to have us survey the evidence,
and every reasonable inference and intendment that can fairly be drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to him.
This Court has wisely recognized that the printed word is
sterile, lacking the inflection of the witness, the facial
expression of the witness, the emphasis given by the witness
as well as a number of other indicators available to the
trial judge as he ponders his decision.

As this Court

went on to point out in the Child case at 267-26 8,
Passing upon the credibility of witnesses
involves to some extent the judging of what
goes on in the minds of others and is therefore fraught with uncertainty. Whether one
believes a witness is telling the truth often
depends as much or more upon the impression
the witness is making as upon the words he
says. His appearance and demeanor, his manner of expression and tone of voice, his
apparent frankness or candor, or the want
of it; his forthrightness in answering, or
his tendency to hesitate or evade, and in
fact his whole personality go into the composite
effect of the testimony. This is so even
though the hearer may not be paying particular
attention to nor separately evaluating the
interpretation and evaluation of testimony,
there are also difficulties to be encountered
because of the uncertainties found in fact
situations themselves which must be correlated
to the testimony of witnesses. We have heretofore pointed out the trial courtls advantages
in judging the credibility of witnesses and
5
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determining the facts. (Zuniga v. Evansf
87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513, 101 A.L.R.532?
Nokes v, Continental Mining & Milling Co.,
6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954) It is due
to these considerations that it is firmly
established that passing on such matters is
exclusively within his providence.
Numerous decisions by this Court echo these thoughts,
a few of such decisions being Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah
520, 94 P. 2d 465( 1939 J, Hardy V. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d
251, 495 P. 2d 28 (1972), Foster V. Blake Heights Corporation,
Lamb v. Bangart, and Ewell and Son V. Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P. 2d 283? (1974, 1974, 1972.)
The salient testimony and evidence upon which the trial
judge based his decision will be more fully set out in
Point II of this argument but will be summarized here.
Mrs. Cutler testified that a partnership was her understanding from the first.

(R 63, 88)

Tax returns showing Re-

spondent and Appellant each with fifty per cent (50%) ownership of the Havana Club were filed for the partnership
for four years.

(R 78, 80-81, 106, 108, Ex. 7P, 8 ) , 14P-16P)

Appellant, through his attorney, stipulated to introducing
Respondent as his partner.

(R 162B)

Mrs. Cutler had broad

powers to hire, fire, keep the books, take care of the money,
make purchases, and do whatever was necessary to run the
business.

(R 64-67, 121B, 156B)

Respondent and Appellant

each received half of the profits of the business after the
expenses.

(R 88, 118B-119B)
6
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In opposition to this testimony, Appellant offered witnesses who had some vague feeling but no definite knowledge
of the business relationship between Respondent and Appellant.
(R 116, 79B)

Appellant was the exception to this generali-

zation and indicated that he intended no partnership,

(R 122B)

contrary to his actions listed above.
The trial judge indeed had sufficient reason in testimony and evidence to rule as he did

and his decision should

be affirmed.
POINT II
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE INDICATES
THAT A PARTNERSHIP WAS FORMED ON AN ORAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT.
How does one establish the existance of a partnership
where there is no

writing?

Utah Code Ann.

Statutes give us some aid.

§48-1-3 (1953) defines a partnership as

"an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit."

Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4 (1953)

sets forth rules for "determining whether a partnership exists."
Subsection 4 indicates,
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of
the profits of a business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn
if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or
otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or
rent to a landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or
representative of a deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the

7
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amounts of payment vary with the
profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the
sale of the good will of a business
or other property by installments
or otherwise.
The testimony of both Appellant and Respondent established
that Respondent received "a share of the profits of the business ," the presumption then being one of a partnership.

As

this Court stated in Kimball v. McCbrnick, 70 Utah 189, 259
P. 313 (1927), the fact that two persons share profits of a
business raises presumption of a partnership.

This Court

also indicated in Bridgman v. Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 98 P. 186
(1908) at 389, that "the existence of a partnership may be
implied by circumstances."
Courts in other states have made helpful attempts to set
criteria for partnerships.

The Colorado Court in Grau v.

Mitchell, 397 P. 2d 488, 156 Colo. Ill (1964) states that an
express or implied contract between two or more competent
persons to place their money, effects, labor or skill, or
some or all of them, into a business, and to divide the profits
and bear the losses in certain proportions constitutes a partnership.

Oklahoma, in Johnson v. Plastex Co., 500 P. 2d 596

(Qkla*1971) applies much the same formula.

Oregon's court

states three primary factors in determining the existence of a
partnership:
2)

1) the right of a party to share in the profits,

liability to share losses, and 3) the right to exert some

control over the business. Heyes v. Killinger, 235 Or. 465,
'8
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385

P. 2d 747 (1963)
The testimony and evidence in the present case meet

these criteria, also, and help determine "intent" of the
parties, upon which Appellant places so much emphasis.
In the present case, intent, as is frequently true

where

testimony conflicts, must be determined by surrounding
circumstances.

Did the Appellant and Respondent act as if

they were partners?

The trial court concluded, and we

must concur, that they did.

Appellant stipulated that he

had introduced Respondent as his partner.

(R 162B)

Appellant

signed and consented to four years of income tax returns designating Respondent as his "partner" and as half-owner of
the business.

(R Ex. 7P, 8P, 14P-16P, 108, 67)

Books were

kept on a partnership basis. Appellant and Respondent both
indicated that profits were split down the middle after expenses and costs of operation were paid.
119B)

(R 63, 88, 118B-

Appellant left complete management, hiring, firing,

keeping the books, taking care of the money, and all other
essentials to running the business with Respondent subject to
periodic accountings when the net profit was split.

(R 64-67,

119B, 121B, 107)
Appellant indicates a number of cases which state that
merely calling a business relationship a "partnership" does
not make that true. Conversely, it is also true that mere
statements that one is not in a partnership will not make
that true.
9
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As indicated above, the courts weigh the surrounding
circumstances to determine the existence of a partnership.
Statements of Appellant that he did not want to enter into a
partnership must be viewed in the light of what he had to gain.
Apparently he desired the tax advantages of having someone contribute toward the business license, the lease/ the taxes,
and unemployment payments for the employees, without the responsibility of paying social security, unemployment taxes,
and other expenses for the Respondent.

Respondent was a

"partner" at tax time for the advantages to be gained there but
was an "employee" when it came to splitting monies paid because
the bar had to close and its business was disrupted.
Of particular interest is Appellant's handling of the
first $5,000.00 check obtained from the Redevelopment Agency
which Appellant had picked up.
one of

After a session of talk with

the parties involved in the N. C. Bar, Appellant per-

suaded Respondent to endorse the check so he could pay some
"earnest money" on the N. C. Bar, (R 126B, 72, 73)

Appellant

then deposited the check in his personal checking account without paying any earnest money on the N. C. Bar or any other bar.
(R 128B)
Appellant discusses Myrland v. Myrland, 19 Ariz. App. 498r
508 P. 2d 757 (1973), at length, concluding that case to be
similar to the present case.

In that case the lower court

found insufficient facts to constitute a partnership and the
appellate court affirmed.

The case dealt mainly with domestic
10
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problems in unraveling separate and community property for
disposition in divorce proceedings. Mrs. Myrland reported
that at all times Mr. Myrland was paid an hourly wage.
508 P. 2d at 759 Mr. Myrland testified the only time he signed
checks was once when Mrs. Myrland was in the hospital. 508
P. 2d at 760

There was also emphasis that Mrs. Myrland never

filed partnership returns with Mr. Myrland, 508 P 2d at 761,
contrary to the facts in the present case.

The Myrland

case is clearly distinguishable*
Appellant depends for corroboration on witnesses depending
on hearsay for their knowledge of the business relation
Appellant and Respondent had.

Mr. Wright said, "information

was provided me" without identifying any source or background.
(R 116)

Mr. Kingsbury indicated first that the business was

set up as a partnership (R 107) but then stated that the
Appellant and Respondent were not "partners", as I understand
a partner," (R. 108) without indicating what he understood as
a partner, his definition presumably being different from
the legal definition of a partnership.
With Mr. Kakunes, Mr. Jones, Mr. Allen and Mr. Sisneros,
Appellant falsely assumes that what they did not state, was not.
That since they did not state that Respondent was a partner,
Respondent was not a partner.

These witnesses did not know

what arrangements Appellant and Respondent had made. The
arrangement was that each drew $100.00 per v/eek (R 87-88) and
thereafter participated in profits or losses the business in11
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curred.

An indication of Respondent's honesty is that she

refused any claim on partnership assets she felt belonged to
Appellant, and some she had helped to purchase, such as the
tavern license.

Her income was disrupted, and Appellant

backed out on the promise to open another bar, placing the
$5,000.00 in his private account, and Respondent desired some
compensation for the loss of her business.

Respondent relied

on Appellant's representations, to her detriment.

If Re-

spondent were a third party, Appellant would be estopped from
asserting that there was no partnership.
The testimony and evidence support the trial court's
judgment.

That judgment should be affirmed.
POINT III
A PAYMENT "IN LIEU OF MOVING AND RELATED
EXPENSES" IS IN THE NATURE OF COMPENSATION
FOR DISRUPTION OF BUSINESS AND INCOME AND
MUST BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTNERS.

The Relocation Agency, lacking the resources of the
trial court, did not set themselves up as experts in the determination of forms of business.

The Agency operated more

on hearsay and assumptions, wanted to avoid a controversy,
and wanted to help the Havana Club as much as possible in the
relocation process.

(R115-117)

The courts are best qualified

to determine the type of business enterprise Appellant and
Respondent were conducting.
Once the determination is made that the Havana Club was
operated as a partnership, the responsibility of the
Relocation Agency becomes payment to the business for the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disruption of the business.
The guidelines, set forth in Exhibit 17D, require such
disruption to be,
..-a substantial loss of its existing patrongage, based on a consideration of all
pertinent circumstances including such
factors as the type of business conducted,
the nature of the clientele, and the relative
importance of the displaced business of its
present and proposed location.
The handbook requires further that, "the business contributes
materially to the income of the displaced owner," (Ex. 17D)
and defines owner as "the proprietor in a sole propietorship, the principal partners in a partnership, and the
principal stockholders of a corporation..."

(Emphasis added.)

As the lower court determined Respondent to be a partner,
she should share in the money paid to offset her loss of
her share of the business.
Respondent contributed more than "her time and efforts."
As the parties split everything after expenses, she helped
to purchase the lease, the license, the stock, and to maintain
the facilities and clientele.

Respondent made no claim

on the equipment or inventory as she felt Appellant should
get out of the business what he brought in.
Appellant claims, inconsistently, that there was no relocation,
and that there was a relocation to the Apex.

The Apex, if a

relocation of anything, was a relocation of Appellant's ranch
in Idaho.
Appellant's failure to talk the people at the N. C. Bar into
13
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selling and failure to locate another bar cost Respondent
her livelihood, from the business she had built up while
the Appellant was absentee.
The law refuses to allow a murderer to profit from his
crime by collecting insurance on his victim.

One might

say the Appellant killed the partnership when he refused
his partner the $5,000.00 that was rightfully hers

after

obtaining her release on "his" check for $5,000.00f by
misrepresenting that he would use the check for earnest
money on a bar.

He should not be allowed to profit from

the death of the partnership.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence and
testimony amply support the trial court's judgment that
Appellant and Respondent had a partnership at the
Havana Club and that this Court should affirm the courtfs
judgment.

Respectfully,
Don L. Bybee
Roger S. Blavlock
BYBEE & 3LAYL0CK
212 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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